Gun Owners Foundation, amicus curiae, Printz, Mack v. US
The Potowmack Institute
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
JAY PRINTZ, Sheriff/Coroner
Ravalli County, Montana,
UNiTED STATES OF AMERICA,
Brief of Gun Owners' Foundation as
amicus curiae in support of
Petitioner Jay Printz
Interest of the Amicus Curiae
Gun Owners Foundation is an Internal Revenue Code
Section 501(c)(3) organization incorporated under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Its purposes are
to educate the public about the importance of the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and
to provide legal and other assistance for law-abiding
individuals involved in firearms-related cases. GOF’s
more than 100,000 contributors are, by
self-definition, strongly interested in the right to
keep and bear arms and in opposing legislation which
burdens or impedes that right.
* Together with the consolidated case of Sheriff
Richard Mack v. United States, No. 95-1503.
Additionally, the Foundation also strongly supports
effective constitutional law enforcement, especially
at the State and local levels, and opposes the
frequent forays by Congress into essentially local
areas those reserved to the States and the people
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States
To federalize a crime is frequently to trivialize it.
In many congressional attempts to be seen as fighting
crime by passing "feel good" legislation, the national
legislature forgets that the entire Federal Bureau of
Investigation is less than a third the size of the New
York City Police Department and that the entire
federal judiciary could not fill the muster rolls of
the Los Angeles County courts. These congressional
digressions not only detract from legitimate federal
interests, but affirmatively burden and impede local
law enforcement, as in this case.
The not infrequent result is invalid legislation such
as that recently condemned in United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d (1995).
In this case, where hundreds of thousands of makework
background checks have been imposed on unwilling local
draftees, the result is even more pernicious. These
background checks had, as of July 1995, produced
exactly seven prosecutions
prosecutions which would have been
possible under existing federal law regardless of the
3 More importantly,
the checks have detracted from
the official duties and responsibilities (and
resources) of local law enforcement the real front
line of the real war on real crime.
By letter dated July 10, 1996, the Acting Solicitor
General of the United States consented to the filing
of this brief. By letter dated July 7, 1996, counsel
for the petitioner consented to the
filing of this brief. By letter dated July 9, 1996,
counsel for the petitioner in No. 95-1503 consented to
the filing of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Foundation adopts petitioner’s Statement of the
Case and incorporates that portion of petitioner’s
The petitioner in this case has formulated the issue
Whether Congress has power under Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution, consistent
with the Tenth Amendment as interpreted in New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), to command
State-created chief law enforcement officers: to
search records and to ascertain whether persons may
lawfully purchase handguns; to destroy records
concerning handgun purchasers; and to provide the
reasons for adverse determinations, as mandated by the
Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), (6)(B) and (C).
Petitioner in the consolidated Mack case has
formulated the issues presented as follows:
The Amicus is mindful of the stricture of Rule
14.1(a) of the Court that "[o]nly the questions set
out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will
be considered by the Court." If petitioners in these
two cases are correct about the Commerce Clause/Tenth
Amendment defects in the Brady Act and we
contend they are then additional
1. Whether Congress exceeds its Commerce Clause powers
when it orders State officials, themselves neither
engaged in nor interfering with interstate commerce,
to exercise their police powers with regard to
2. Whether a Federal statute requiring State officials
to investigate and pass upon the background of each
handgun purchaser can be reconciled with the Tenth
Amendment as construed in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), on the claimed
distinction that it commandeers a State’s labor rather
than its policymaking.
evidence of those flaws is to be found in other and
corollary conflicts and tensions between the Act and
the Constitution. As the Court has stated, "Congress
exercises its conferred powers subject to the
limitations contained in the Constitution."
A necessary corollary to that statement is, if one or
more limitations contained in the Constitution are
inconsistent with an exercise of purported
congressional power, it must be questioned whether
Congress has been conferred such a power at all.
Accordingly, and in the spirit of the first sentence
of Rule 37(1) of the Court, we respectfully suggest
that the following issues are fairly subsumed within
the issues as to which certiorari was granted:
1. Whether the Brady Act offends the Faithful
Execution clause of Article II, § 3 of the
Constitution and the Appointments Clause of Article
II, § 2 by appointing de facto federal officers
who are not commissioned by or answerable to the
President and who execute federal law enforcement
authority regardless of the powers of the President or
his lawful delegates.
2. Whether the Brady Act impermissibly waives the
sovereign immunity of the States to suit by
individuals illegally or incorrectly denied purchase
3. Whether the Brady Act contravenes the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution by
impermissibly seizing State and local property without
just compensation; and, if not, whether Congress has
inadvertently created an enormous (and unfunded)
liability for commandeered labor and resources.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
With minor exceptions not relevant to this case, the
sole power of appointing lesser officers of the
federal government is reserved by the Constitution to
the President and his subordinates in the Executive
Branch. The President and his subordinates
self-evidently have no power or authority over local
sheriffs and other State and local law officers. The
assignment of federal law enforcement duties to these
local officers offends both the Appointments Clause
and the Faithful Execution Clause of Article II
requiring the President to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. This lack of accountability
raises numerous subsidiary questions also suggesting
that the Act exceeds the Commerce Clause power of
The Act also purports to create a private cause of
action against the States by disappointed applicants,
including a provision for the award of attorney fees
and costs. This arbitrary attempt to waive the States’
sovereign immunity to suit offends the dual
sovereignty framework of the Constitution, and raises
serious collateral issues with respect to the Eleventh
Amendment and this Court’s original jurisdiction under
The practical effect of the Act is an arbitrary taking
of State and local resources (private property)
compensation and it is therefore violative of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Amicus urges reversal of the decisions
below based on the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
considerations set forth by the petitioners. Given the
seemingly extraordinary intrusion of the Brady Act
into State and local authority, we believe that
additional evidence of the Act’s infirmity under the
Commerce Clause is to be found in the conflicts and
tensions it creates with other provisions of the
Constitution, which suggest the following additional
grounds compelling reversal:
I. The Brady Act offends the Faithful Execution clause
of Article II, § 3 of the Constitution and the
Appointments Clause of Article II, § 2 by
appointing de facto federal officers who are not
commissioned by or answerable to the President and who
execute federal law enforcement authority regardless
of the powers of the President or his lawful
In a strange perversion of the doctrine of posse
Congress, by the Brady Act, has rounded up the
sheriffs themselves as a posse to pursue fugitive
It is clear that federal authorities can
request local assistance in executing federal
It is equally clear that federal authorities can
accept assistance from willing local authorities who,
under some circumstances, voluntarily enforce federal
7 What is not
clear indeed, what is utterly
counterintuitive is that the national legislature
can compel a State or local law officer to execute a
national criminal law.
It is axiomatic that the limited powers and duties of
the federal government under our Constitution were
carefully and intentionally apportioned by the
Founders among the three organs of the national
9 Two of the most important
powers and duties allocated to the President by the
Constitution are the power to appoint and commission
lesser officers (Art. II, § § 2, 3) and the
duty and authority to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed (Art. II, § 3).
With the exception of the advice and consent duties of
the power of the courts to appoint their own
officers and employees,
and the impeachment duties of the Congress and the
it would appear that the appointment power belongs
solely to the Executive Branch. The Court has
previously had to curtail an attempt by Congress to
poach on that power. Buckley v. Valeo 4 U.S. 1
(1976). In doing so, the Court noted that
congressionally-appointed members of the Federal
Election Commission were no less "inferior officers’
for purposes of the Appointments Clause than were
clerks of court.
We submit that the federal law enforcement duties
imposed by the Brady Act on Chief Law Enforcement
(hereafter "CLEOs") is of at least as great a dignity
as, and no different in kind from, the essentially
ministerial activities of postmasters and clerks of
There can be no argument that the Brady Act is other
than purely federal legislation enacted by the federal
legislature to further perceived federal law
enforcement ends. Yet the Act’s entire execution is
assigned to individuals who are not federal officers,
who are not appointed by the President or his
subordinates in the Executive Branch, who are
accountable to no federal official,
and who possess no federal authority other than
that purported to be created by the Act.
The President cannot fire or discipline or supervise a
sheriff who refuses to perform his Brady Act duties or
who performs them badly. The federal Chief Magistrate
has no power to supervise or oversee this execution of
a purely federal law in any sense. Indeed, his Justice
Department subordinates have abandoned even the
prospect of negative supervision by repudiating the
right to prosecute criminal violations of the Act by
Moreover, the CLEO is not even answerable in tort for
some aspects of his execution of the Act.
Do these immunity provisions override the officer’s
potential liability under the federal civil rights
Or is she now accountable as a "federal" officer under
the rationale of Bivens
and its progeny? And if so, does this immunity
provision also provide immunity from a Bivens action,
an immunity even a duly commissioned federal officer
does not enjoy? And more oddly yet, does §
922(s)(7) create local tort suit immunity in some
instances where a particular State has waived its
sovereign immunity for comparable actions by its law
enforcement officials? In other words, the Act not
only affirmatively invades the States’ sovereign
immunity to suit, as argued below, but it may have
created a defense to individual liability which a
particular State has, in its sovereign judgment,
decided to make unavailable to an erring law officer.
What happens when a CLEO is injured in the process of
enforcing the Act? Is he a federal employee for
purposes of the Federal Employees Compensation Act? If
not, is she entitled to State workers compensation
for an injury incurred outside the scope of her
The full extent of the offense against the
Appointments and Faithful Execution Clauses can be
capsulized by observing that the Brady Act would not
even authorize an FBI agent or other duly appointed
federal law officer to perform that is, to
faithfully execute the requirements of the Act.
II. The Brady Act impermissibly waives the sovereign Immunity of the States to suit by Individuals illegally or incorrectly denied purchase of handguns.
Although the government lamely seeks to minimize the
practical effect of the Brady Act’s intrusion into
State and local sovereignty,
the conceptual scope of the Act’s intrusion is
breathtaking. The Act can fairly be viewed as a
legislative analogue to the British Crown’s 18th
Century writs of assistance commanding "all officers
and subjects of the Crown to assist in their
execution." That kind of governmental abuse of power
was a direct cause of our Revolution and has been
consistently condemned by this Court.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this intrusion is
§ 925A of Title 18, added to the Gun Control Act
by the Brady Amendments, which provides in pertinent
...any person denied a firearm ... due to the
provision of erroneous information ... by any State
... or who was not prohibited from receipt of a
firearm ... may bring an action against the State ...
responsible for providing the erroneous information
... or ... for denying the transfer.
The section then provides for an award to the
successful plaintiff of a reasonable attorney’s fee
"as part of costs."
We are not told in what court such an action will lie,
but it is clear that the proposed suits are
targeted directly at States and their political
subdivisions. The plain language of the provision also
seems to suggest that an action would be available
against a State by a citizen of another State
or of a foreign state
where the defendant
State provides erroneous background information to an
inquiring CLEO ("due to the provision of erroneous
information by any state"). These would
be obvious and impermissible violations of the
Nor is there any clue as to the source of funding for
an award of attorney fees. It seems clear that no
federal judgment fund would be available to satisfy a
judgment against a State or one of its political
The only apparent answer is that the States and their
subdivisions have involuntarily acquired a new
liability for attorney fees and costs imposed by
Congress and payable to private citizens. This would
seem to add an entirely new dimension to the concept
of revenue sharing.
Most offensive to the traditional concept of dual
sovereignty, however, is the seemingly offhand manner
in which the Act simply mandates that disappointed
applicants may sue the State concerned. Period. And
regardless of any State principles of sovereign
immunity to suit.
We make no argument here that the United States (and
its institutions and agencies) cannot sue a State.
Those suits are clearly a function of the Supremacy
Clause or of implied consent or waiver by the State in
adopting the Constitution or in accepting Statehood.
But, we can find
no case where Congress has ever purported to create,
or this Court has ever sanctioned, a suit by a private
citizen against a State on a private cause of action.
"Perhaps because the point is so obvious, we have
never been confronted with a controversy that required
us to rule upon it...." Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
We respectfully submit that it is not the scope of the
federal intrusion which invalidates this legislation,
but the fact of it. "The question is not what power
the Federal Government ought to have, but what powers
have been given by the people."
III. The Brady Act contravenes the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution by
impermissibly seizing State and local property without
just compensation; otherwise, Congress has
inadvertently created an enormous (and unfunded)
liability for commandeered labor and resources.
The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. It
is clear from the federal condemnation cases against
States that State (and local government) property is
"private property" for purposes of the Takings Clause.
In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), the Court held unconstitutional a statute
requiring that States "take title to" radioactive
waste a commandeering of the States’ resources.
To require taking title to radioactive waste coupled
with a legal obligation to move it, store it, or
dispose of it, is to seize the States’ time, money,
effort, and other economic resources to seize
private property. The Court phrased the issue there in
property terms, "commandeering of resources," but did
not address the Takings Clause ramifications.
The Brady Act mandates a similar seizure of State
time, money, effort and other economic resources, and
contains no compensation provision. If this is not a
literal violation of the Takings Clause, it is the
inter-sovereign analogue. And it is more perverse. Not
only does the Act violate the sanctity of private
property at the root of the Takings Clause, but it
offends the basic concept of our federal
constitutional system, dual sovereignty.
Outside the framework of reference of our federal
system, when one sovereign entity simply by fiat or
superior power appropriates the property of another,
it is known as pillage, plunder, aggression or war.
And it offends the deepest principles of international
comity, just as this Act offends the principles of
comity between the national government and the States:
[T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. The Constitution, in all its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
We know the sheriff and his employees are not regarded
as federal employees for compensation purposes.
Neither, then, can his supplies, equipment, and
other resources be so regarded.
If federal agents marched into Sheriff Printz’ office
tomorrow and confiscated for their own official use a
portion of his office supplies, part of his employee
payroll, and a third of the gasoline in the tanks of
his patrol cars, there could be no doubt that their
actions were illegal. The fact that they did it
pursuant to the Attorney General’s instruction or a
judge’s warrant would not lessen the offense; indeed,
it would raise the act from simple theft to an
unconstitutional taking by the United States. One
hypothesize a situation short of federal martial law
where such conduct would be defensible.
What the Executive Branch and the Courts cannot do
under color of official authority we submit the
Congress likewise cannot do. And the reason is plain:
such arbitrary takings without compensation offend the
The Court of Appeals in its decision below
attempted to sidestep this aspect of the Act by
characterizing it as de minimus.
This is akin to holding that the
Act is not grand larceny but merely pickpocketing. The
plain language of the Takings Clause would not appear
to countenance "minor" takings without compensation.
And when the cumulative national effect of the Act
upon the property of the States is taken into account,
it can hardly be argued that the taking is
If the Court were inclined to rule against the Takings
Clause objection, then the government will eventually
be confronted with the rather interesting question of
whether Congress has unintentionally created a large,
unfunded liability in implied contract.
Those provisions of the Brady Act purporting to
require federal law enforcement duties to be performed
by State and local officials and purporting to create
a cause of action by disappointed citizens against
their State or local governments should be declared
unconstitutional. The decision below should be
GUN OWNERS FOUNDATION,
Amicus Curiae in support of
Petitioners Printz and Mack
JAMES H. JEFFRIES, III
Counsel of Record
JAMES H. WENTZEL
1. Lopez declared unconstitutional the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a), as exceeding
the Commerce Clause power of the Congress. Although
perhaps not determinative of this Court’s disposition,
it is noteworthy that § 922(q) was duplicative of
43 different State statutes, including that of the
State involved there, Texas.
2. Government Accounting Office Report No. GAO/GGD-96-
22, Gun Control: Implementation of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, pp. 8,43 (GAO;
Washington, D.C.; Jan. 1996).
3. Pre-Brady provisions of the Gun Control Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. § § 921-930, require a written
denial, subject to penalty for perjury, of all the
federal disabilities to purchase of a handgun. A false
statement on a BATF Form 4473, "Firearms Transaction
Record," is punishable as a felony under either §
922(aX6) or § 1001 of Title 18, United States
Code, just as a Brady Act false statement is. Indeed,
one who falsifies a Brady Act form (BATF Form 5300.35,
"Statement of Intent to Obtain a Handgun(s)") must
also and consistently falsify the Form 4473 if the
background check fails to catch his Brady Act false
statement. Otherwise, the purchaser is trapped in a
dilemma comparable to that posed by 18 U.S.C. §
1623 (inconsistent sworn statements; government not
required to show which is false).
4. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156
5. Literally "the power of the county." The historic
power of local law officers, probably deriving from
the ancient "hue and cry," to enlist the aid of
bystander citizens in meeting law enforcement
emergencies. See Livingston v. Dorgenois, 11
U.s. 577, 579 (1813); South v. Maryland, 59
U.S. 396, 402 (1856); In re Quarles, 158 U.S.
532, 535 (1895); United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 178 (1977). Some may be tempted
to characterize this odd law as being motivated by a
congressional desire to be seen as fighting the war on
crime while avoiding the pain of actually bearing arms
in the conflict.
6. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 331(g) provides that
the FBI may request investigative assistance "from any
... local agency...."; and Section 878 of Title 21,
U.S.C., authorizes the Attorney General to deputize
willing state and local law enforcement officers for
drug enforcement duties.
7. E.g., Section 1324(c) of Title 8, U.S.C.,
authorizes State and local officials to enforce the
illegal immigration provisions. See United States
v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir.
1984); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d
468(9th Cir. 1983). Cf. Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1946). See also 18 U.S.C.*
3041 authorizing local officials to issue process for
arrest. The Fifth Circuit has held that the phrase
‘some other officer’ in Rule 4(dXl) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure includes State and local
officers among those authorized to execute a federal
arrest warrant. United States v. Bowdach, 561
F.2d 1160 (1977).
8. Nine of the 15 federal judges who have considered
the statute do not think it can. Koog v. United
States, 79 F.3d 452(5th Cir. 1996) (two cases),
aff'g McGee v. United States, 863 F.Supp. 321
(S.D. Miss. 1994), and rev’g and rem’g Koog v.
United States, 852 F.Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994),
petition for cert. pending; Frank v. United
States, 860 F.Supp. 1030 (Vt. 1994), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996); Mack
v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995)
(two cases), rev’g, aff'g in part, and dism’g in pad,
Mack v. United States 856 F.Supp. 1372 (Ariz.
1994), and aff’g in part, dism’g in part, and rev’g
Printz v. United States, 854 F.Supp. 1503
(Mont. 1994); Romero v. United States, 883
F.Supp. 1076 (W.D.
9. "... the Constitution protects us from our own best
intentions: it divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so we may
resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the
day." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
10. Characterized by this Court in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 577 (1992),
as "the Chief Executive’s most important
11. Const.,Art.II. § 2.
13. Const., Art. I, § 3.
14. 424 U.S. at 126, citing Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
15. Ibid., citing Ex parte Hennen, 13
Peters 230 (1839).
16. Defined by 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX8) as ‘the chief
of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer or
the designee of any such officer.’
17. Other than in the limited and indirect sense that
all civil officers of the States are mandated by
Article VI of the Constitution to take an oath to
18. Note 23, infra. The Court has held that
"the constitutional authority of Congress cannot be
expanded by the ‘consent’ of the governmental unit
whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is
the Executive Branch or the States." New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq.
21. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (personal
tort liability of
individual federal officers for intentional
22.See Note 34, infra.
23. The government’s reasoning that the criminal
provisions of the Brady Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5))
do not apply to CLEOs is specious. (Office of Legal
Counsel Memorandum of March 16, 1994; Printz Def. Ex.
2, Rec. 23.) There is nothing ambiguous in the least
about the term "whoever violates...." Even a cursory
reading of the statute reveals that just two classes
of persons are charged with enforceable duties and
prohibitions under the Act: gun dealers and CLEOs. And
every gun dealer activity mandated or forbidden by
Brady was punishable by the Gun Control Act as it
existed prior to the Brady Amendments. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(D). Thus, by the government’s analysis
the criminal provisions of Brady apply to no one (or,
at best, operate only to reduce some gun dealer
felonies to misdemeanors).
24. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
363-365 (1959); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 100-101 (1959); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.s. 476, 481-484 (1965). See also, N. Lasson, The
History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (1937); and Fraenkel,
"Concerning Searches and Seizures," 34 Harv.L.Rev.
25. Other than in this Court under its original
jurisdiction. Const., Art. III, § 2.
26. This is more than a merely theoretical possibility
given the two federal databases which the CLEOs are
mandated to check by Attorney General Order No.
1853-94, 59 Fed. Reg. 9498 (Feb. 28, 1994). Every
State participates in furnishing information to the
National Crime Information Center and the information
freely flows across State lines.
27. Legally admitted aliens are permitted by federal
law to purchase firearms in the United 5tates under
certain circumstances. See 27C.F.R. § 178.11,
"State of residence"
28. Unless incurring such an involuntary indebtedness
could be deemed an implied contract-in-fact
recompensable by suit against the United States. See
28 U.S.C. § § 1346(a)(2) (District Court
jurisdiction over implied contracts) and 1491(aXl)
(Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over implied
29. E.g., United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621 (1892); Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Parden v.
Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145
(1965). The implied consent of the States to suit
against them by the United
States and its agencies is not, however, consent to
suit by anyone whom the United States might wish to
select as a plaintiff. Blatchford v. Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991).
30. Nollan held that "of the principal uses of
eminent domain is to assure that the government be
able to require conveyance of [properties], so long as
it pays for them, ibid., which takes us to Argument
31. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63
(1936), quoted in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 at 157 (1992).
32. E.g., United States v. Carmack, 329
U.S. 230 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Chappell
v. United States, 160 U.S. 499 (1896). The federal
power of eminent domain is limited by the Constitution
so that property may only be taken in the furtherance
of an enumerated power. United States v. Gettysburg
Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 688 (1896).
33. Texas v. White, 7 Wallace 700, 725 (1869).
34. Walton v. United States, 213 Ct.CI. 755
(1977) (even specially deputized state and local
officers are not federal employees for compensation
purposes since they are not appointed to federal
civilian positions). On the other hand, there may be
workers compensation benefits available to CLEOs under
the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §
8101, et seq., which extends benefits to State
and local officers injured while apprehending federal
criminals and to an individual rendering personal
service to the United States. See City of Whittier
v. United States Department of Justice, 598 F.2d
561(9th Cir. 1979).
35. 66 F.3d 1025
"... nothing unusually jarring...." id. at.
1029; "...no more remarkable...." ibid.;
"... a minimal interference with state
functions...." id. at 1031; "... not
different from other minor obligations...."
37. In less than one year in just 30 States, CLEOs
were required to process more that 440,000 Brady Act
applications. GAO Report, Note 2, supra, at 29-30
38. See, e.g., Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
(1984); Missouri Health & Medical Organization, Inc.
v. United States, 226 Ct.Cl. 274, 641 F2d 870 (1981). Cf.
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992).
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