The Potowmack Institute
Submitted by George M. Strickler, Jr.
ACADEMICS FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT
ACADEMICS FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT is an IRS sec. 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota. The organization fosters open, rigorous discussion of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Many but not all of the signatories of this brief who include scholars in the fields of law, humanities, and the social sciences are members of Academics for the Second Amendment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
of "collective" or "state" right to maintain formal military organizations. Indeed, the arguments and evidence that support this conclusion are so overwhelming that commentators who wish to dispute it avoid confronting those arguments and evidence. Instead, they rely on misleading and irrelevant historical data, inapposite judicial opinions, and sometimes on outright sophistries. The inexorable power of the arguments in favor of the individual-right interpretation has persuaded scholars from all points on the political spectrum, including those who embrace a variety of interpretive theories. 1 Even Professor Laurence Tribe, a long-time proponent of the statesí right theory, has now unequivocally acknowledged that the Second Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to keep and bear arms:
Similarly, distinguished legal historian Leonard W. Levy has concluded that there is simply no doubt about the personal nature of the rights protected by the Second Amendment: "Believing that the amendment does not authorize an individualís right to keep and bear arms is wrong. The right to bear arms is an individual right." 3
I. The text of the Second Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to keep and bear arms.
The Second Amendment unambiguously protects "the right of the people" to
keep and bear arms. This is exactly the same phrase used in the First and Fourth Amendments, where it indubitably refers to individual rights. All three amendments were framed at the same time, along with the Tenth Amendment, which expressly distinguishes between "the people" and "the states." Thus, the framers of the Amendment clearly chose to protect a right of individuals, not a right belonging to the states.
a free State, the right of the Militia to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." But the Constitution does not say this. On the contrary, the Second Amendment clearly distinguishes "the people" from the "militia." The framers, moreover, were familiar with dozens of state constitutional provisions that included similar explanatory phrases, none of which had ever been interpreted to limit or qualify the operative language to which they were appended. 5
forces," while requiring them to keep up a "militia." 6 This sharp distinction between formal military organizations and the militia was maintained in Article I of our Constitution, which consistently refers to "armies," "land forces," and "troops" in contradistinction to the "militia." 7
exercises with his own firearm and other equipment. 9 That legal tradition has continued right down to the present day. Even under current law, the militia does not consist only of those who volunteer for the National Guard, but rather of:
appreciated without understanding what occurred at the Convention.
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 12
The salient feature of these provisions is that they grant the federal government virtually unfettered authority over the militia, thus permitting the creation of exactly the sort of "select militia" that was widely considered a dangerous perversion. What is more, the Constitution also grants the federal government virtually unfettered authority to create standing armies. 13 These decisions by the Convention represented a sharp and almost complete repudiation of the desire for legal limitations on the federal governmentís ability to create military organizations that could be used to oppress the people. Far from being inadvertent, this repudiation of a widespread sentiment favoring the citizen militia as an alternative to standing armies was
deliberate and well considered.
The essence of the Anti-Federalist position is captured in Attorney General Luther Martin's famous Genuine Information, which bitterly denounced:
Similarly, the Federal Farmer wrote:
The Federalists could not deny that the new Constitution would take control of the militia away from the states as a legal matter, or that the federal government would have the legal authority to create a select militia. But they did deny that there was cause for serious alarm. In the Federalist Papers, for example, Madison wrote at length about the improbability that the federal government would ever become animated by a spirit of oppression. Assuming for the sake of argument that this could happen, however, Madison contended that America's armed citizenry could not be subdued by such a government:
of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. 17
Thus the Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared the assumption that the new federal government should lack the power to disarm the citizenry. Without that assumption, Madison's argument would collapse because the American people would then be as easy to subdue as the Europeans. This was not enough for the Anti-Federalists, who wanted additional safeguards in the form of restrictions on the federal government's military resources. 18 But the Federalists prevailed, and the Constitution was ratified as proposed.
militia because a truly well regulated militia must, among other things, be drawn from an armed citizenry. If the federal government were to disarm the citizenry and set up a "select militia" composed of what the Federal Farmer called "the young and ardent part of the community," this would represent the classic perversion of the militia system, familiar to the founding generation from the history preceding England's Revolution of 1689. Such a select militia might certainly be heavily regulated, but it just as certainly would not be "well regulated." 19
substantial reasons not to attempt through law to guarantee the continuation of the traditional citizen-militia system, or to forbid the new federal government from creating standing armies and select militias. Nor did the original Constitution purport to prevent the federal government from letting the traditional citizen militia fall into desuetude through lack of training. The Second Amendment leaves untouched the discretion over armies and militias that was granted to Congress by Article I of the Constitution, and protects only the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
importance of the right to keep and bear arms is confirmed by the complete absence of any suggestion by any member of the Federal Convention, or by any participant in the ratification debates, that the federal government should be given the power to disarm its citizens.
II. The legislative history of the Second Amendment confirms that it protects the right of individuals to keep and bear arms.
The drafting history of the Second Amendment, and the limited debate about it in the First Congress, confirm that the right to keep and bear arms is a right possessed by individuals. James Madison, who offered the initial proposal for a Bill of Rights, memorialized his understanding that these constitutional amendments would protect "private rights." 21 This understanding was particularly plain with respect to the right to arms because Madison initially proposed that the guarantee be
inserted into Article I, section 9, immediately after the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, not into Article I, section 8, where the Militia Clauses are located. 22
The House of Representatives revised Madisonís proposal, and adopted the following version:
The Senate made additional revisions, and adopted the wording that became part of
During the congressional process, three major changes were made. Congress decided to omit the conscientious objector clause, along with its hint that the right to arms might be restricted to those performing military service. Congress also deleted the term "well armed militia," thus eliminating any suggestion that the constitutional right to arms might only be a right to an armed militia. And Congress eliminated the description of the militia as "composed of the body of the people," thus avoiding any suggestion that the "people" and the "militia" might be identical. All of these alterations increased the clarity with which the final text protected an individual right, belonging to all citizens, rather than some sort of "right" applicable only to those performing military duties. 26
governments. 27 This theory, which developed only in the twentieth century, is not supported by a single statement anywhere in the historical record. 28 This should not be surprising, for such an interpretation would convert the Second Amendment from a straightforward denial of federal authority to disarm individual citizens into a radical revision of the Federal Conventionís well considered and thoroughly debated decision to give Congress plenary control over both the military and the militia. Modern commentators may wish to believe that the Second Amendment gave the Anti-Federalists the victory they were denied when the Constitution was ratified, but the Anti-Federalists themselves were under no such illusion? 29
be under the government of the laws of the respective States, when not in the actual Service of the united States." 30 This proposal, if it was ever seriously entertained at all, was rejected. But its existence confirms the obvious proposition that if the First Congress had decided to accede to Anti-Federalist desires for constitutional constraints on federal authority over the militia, the necessary language was readily available. And that language could not be more different from the text actually adopted in the Second Amendment.
III. The "statesí right" interpretation of the Second Amendment leads to absurd consequences.
state militias as independent military forces by turning them into adjuncts of the federal army through the National Guard system. 33 Thus, under the statesí right theory, the National Guard is unconstitutional. Similarly, the statesí right interpretation implies that state gun regulations preempt those of the federal government. If a state decided to regulate its own militia by requiring or authorizing its citizens to arm themselves with fully automatic battle carbines and portable rocket launchers, such legislation would override the current federal restrictions on such weapons. In fact, if one took the purpose attributed to the Second Amendment by the statesí right theory seriously, it would seem to follow that all federal gun control regulations are invalid because control over the private possession of arms lies exclusively in the state governments. 34
IV. The Yassky Brief misconstrues the language of the Second Amendment and distorts the relevant legislative history.
Without attempting to catalog every error in the brief submitted to this Court
by the Ad Hoc Group of Law Professors and Historians ("Yassky Briefí), we would call the Courtís attention to four especially egregious flaws in its analysis.
of killing game."36 Third, a bill proposed by James Madison himself in the Virginia legislature imposed penalties on a violator of the game laws if he subsequently "shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty." 37 The Yassky Briefs attempt to give the phrase "keep and bear arms" an exclusively military meaning is simply a canard. 38
constitutional amendments adopted by state ratifying conventions do not "suggest" a right to possess arms outside of military service. Those proposals refute this contention on their face: each one lists the "right to keep and bear arms" separately from statements about such matters as the militia, standing armies, and conscientious objectors. 39
V. The fundamental importance of the individual right to keep and bear arms has not been nullffied by subsequent historical events.
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." 40 Blackstone made no distinction between the "violence of oppression" that would result from tyrannical government and from governmentís failure to control common criminals. There is a good reason for this: you are equally dead if you are killed by a tyrant or a highwayman, and a government that disarms you leaves you vulnerable to both. Conversely, a citizen who took up arms against a tyrant, or a robber, or a foreign invader was in each case acting in defense of both his community and himself. 41
private prosecutors in enforcing the criminal laws. Our habitual modern dichotomy between private and public actions had much less meaning for those who lived with governments that operated on a much smaller scale than our own. Thus, the right to keep and bear arms was a right whose public and private aspects were deeply intertwined. 43 And they remain intertwined today.
investment of resources. 44 Just as Madison expected an armed citizenry to deter would-be tyrants, the Nazis in fact refrained from invading Switzerland. 45 The continuing relevance of deterrence against domestic oppression is also suggested by the historical experience of black Americans. Gun control laws were frequently used to help secure the political subordination of the black population, which might well have been considerably more difficult if blacks had enjoyed the same right to firearms that the white population reserved for itse1f. 46
society have not changed since the eighteenth century, and an armed citizenry continues to have great value both to those who choose to be armed and to their fellow citizens. Contrary to widespread misconceptions, armed resistance to criminal violence is very common, and much more successful in preventing injuries to the victim than passive acquiescence. 48 An armed citizenry is also an extremely powerful deterrent to violent crime, and the huge number of crimes that are prevented by this deterrent constitute an important private and public benefit. 49
VI. The arbitrary disarmament of American citizens violates the Second Amendment.
convicted of violent crimes are constitutionally permissible, as are laws disarming children and the mentally ill. Indeed, the statute at issue in this case would be constitutionally defensible if it imposed a temporary firearms disability on persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders issued after ajudge had made findings of past or future dangerousness.
the judgment below must be AFFIRMED.
George M. Strickler, Jr.
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
1. See, e.g., R. Barnett & D. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 1139, 1146, 1210 (1996). text@note1
2.Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 902 n.221 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added). For Professor Tribeís earlier views, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 11(1991); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 299 n.6(2ded. 1988). text@note2
3. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 134 (1999) (emphasis added). text@note3
4. See, e.g., D. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1359, 1362 & n. 1 (citing dozens of articles endorsing the individual right interpretation); Barnett & Kates, supra note 1, at 1143-45 & nfl. 12-17 (discussing the literature on both sides of issue). text@note4
5. E. Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793 (1998). text@note5
6. Articles of Confederation art. VI, ¶ 4. text@note6
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cis. 12, 14, 15, 16; § 10, ci. 3. text@note7
8. E.g., D. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 1007, 1022 (1994). text@note8
9. Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. text@note9
10. 10 U.S.C. § 311. The Yassky Brief, at 24, misleadingly ignores the current legal definition of the militia, quoting instead the statutory provision that defines a subset of the militia as the "organized militia." text@note10
11. Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and BearArms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 35-38 (1994). text@note11
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16. text@note12
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. text@note13
14. See 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 616-17(1911). text@note14
15. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information, delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, held at Philadelphia, in 1787 (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra note 14, at 208 (emphasis in original omitted). text@note15
16. 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 242 (H. Storing, ed. 1981). text@note16
17. The Federalist No. 46, at 299 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) text@note17
18. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1311, 1352 (1997) (discussing Anti-Federalist fears). text@note18
19. See N. Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 24-26 (1996) (explaining why the term "well regulated" does not imply that the militia must be heavily regulated). text@note19
20. A. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1167 (1991) ("the notion that congressional power in clause 16 to Ďorganiz[e}í and Ďdisciplin[e]í the general militia logically implied congressional power to disarm the militia entirely is the very heresy the Second Amendment was designed to deny"). text@note20
21. 12 Papers of James Madison 193-94 (C. Hobson et al., eds. 1979) (notes for speech proposing bill of rights); id., vol. 11, at 307 (letter to Edmund Pendleton). text@note21
22. The Complete Bill of Rights. The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 169 (N. Cogan, ed., 1997) (reprinting contemporaneous accounts). text@note22
23. Id. at 169 (reprinting 1 Congressional Register 427 (June 8, 1789)). text@note23
24. Id. at 172 (reprinting Journal of the House of Representatives 107 (Aug. 21, 1789)); see also id. at 173 (reprinting Senate journal entries memorializing the text received from the House). text@note24
25. Id. at 176 (reprinting Senate Pamphlet). text@note25
26. Although we lack records of the debates in the Senate, we do know that the Senate rejected a proposal that would have qualified the right to keep and bear arms by adding the phrase "for the common defence." Id. at 174-75 (reprinting Senate documents). This is yet further proof that Congress was scrupulous to avoid language suggesting that the right to arms might be confined to military contexts. text@note26
27. Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right 83 (1984). text@note27
28. Nineteenth century courts and legal commentators also agreed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Kopel, supra note 4. text@note28
29. E.g., Complete Bill of Rights, supra note 22, at 186 (statement of Rep. Elbridge Gerry, Aug. 17, 1789). text@note29
30. Id. at 169. text@note30
31. E.g., Yassky Brief at 4. text@note31
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 16; § 10, cl. 3. text@note32
33. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). text@note33
34. For further detail, see 0. Reynolds & D. Kates, The Second Amendment and Statesí Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1737 (1995). text@note34
35. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XIII (emphasis added); James B. Whisker, The Rise and Decline of the American Militia System 212-24(1999). text@note35
36. Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 623-24 (M. Jensen ed., 1976) (emphasis added). text@note36
37. 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 443 (J.P. Boyd, ed. 1950) (reproducing bill introduced by Madison on Oct. 31, 1785) (emphasis added). text@note37
38. Even more strangely, the Yassky Brief, at 12 n.4, suggests that the use of commas in the Second Amendment somehow links "A well regulated Militia" to "shall not be infringed," as though the Constitution should be read to say: "A well regulated Militia shall not be infringed." This desperate gambit ignores the Constitutionís frequent use of commas that would be considered extraneous in modern usage (e.g., in the First and Third Amendments). text@note38
39. For a detailed analysis of these and many other proposals for constitutional amendments, all of which were reviewed by Madison when he drafted his proposed bill of rights, see D. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & Pol. 1, 43-53 (1987). text@note39
40. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *144. text@note40
41. E.g., D. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 225-35 (1983). text@note41
42. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. text@note42
43. For further detail, see D. Kates, The Second A,nend,nent and the Ideology of Self- Protection, 9 Const. Commentary 87 (1992). text@note43
44. See, e.g., S. Levinson, The Embarrassing SecondAmendment, 99 Yale L. J. 637,657 n.96 (1989). text@note44
45. Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (1998). text@note45
46. R. Cottrol & R. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Georgetown L.J. 309 (1991). text@note46
47. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depít of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). text@note47
48. G. Kleck & M. Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 150, 15 1-52, 174-75 (1995); Gary Kieck, Targeting Guns: Firearms and their Control 167-77 (1997). text@note48
49. See, e.g., J. Lott & D. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-to-Carry Concealed Weapons, 26 J. Leg. Studies 1(1997); Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1994, at 57. text@note49
51. For further detail, see N. Lund, The Ends
of SecondAmendment Jurisprudence: Firearms
Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining
Orders,, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Politics 157
Donald L. Alexander, Mike Allen, Larry P. Arnn, Kathryn Balmforth,
Randy E. Barnett, Herman Belz, Bruce L. Benson, David T. Beito,
David J. Bordua, John W. Bowman, David M. Brasington, Kingsley R. Browne,
Stanley C. Brubaker, Robert A. Carter, C. David Channell, J. Bradford Churchill,
John P. Cochran, Lloyd R. Cohen, James M. Collins, Robert J. Cottrol,
Preston K. Covey, Mickey Craig, John W. Danford, Raymond T. Diamond,
Jan E. Dizard, Steven Duke, Steven J. Eagle, John C. Eastman, Edward J. Erler,
Frank Falero, Morris Fiorina, F. Smith Fussner, Janice J. Gabbert,
Todd F. Gaziano, Stephen G. Gilles, Gregory Goering, Fran Haga,
J. Daniel Hammond, Francis F. Hawley, David R. Henderson, David M. Henneberry,
John Hospers, Ronald A. Howard, Richard Hummel, Lester H. Hunt,
Scott C. Idleman, Robert Jacobs, D. Bruce Johnsen, Nicholas Johnson,
David L. Kaserman, Don B. Kates, Raymond G. Kessler, Bruce H. Kobayashi,
Alan Charles Kors, Michael I. Krauss, David N. Laband, Mark LeBar,
Edward F. Leddy, Robert A. Levy, Jody Lipford, Charles H. Logan,
Roderick T. Long, Tibor R. Machan, Gregory E. Maggs, Joyce Lee Malcolm,
Marie Martin, Ken Masugi, David Mayer, James Ross McCown, Edwin Meese III,
J. Mitchell Miller, Gary B. Mills, Carlisle E. Moody, James E. Moore, II,
Richard Morgan, John Moser, David B. Mustard, Robert Natelson, Joseph P. Olson,
James R. Otteson, Carol K. Oyster, Daniel C. Palm, Jeffrey S. Parker,
Mark J. Perry, Ronald J. Pestritto, Michael Pippenger, Daniel D. Polsby,
Barry Poulson, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Jeremy Rabkin, Paul A. Rahe,
Douglas B. Rasmussen, Gerard Rault, Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Larry E. Ribstein, Charles K. Rowley,
Steve Russell, William A. Schroeder, Larry Schweikart, Gerald W. Scully,
William F. Shughart II, Robert Barr Smith, Larry D. Soderquist,
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Allan C. Stam, Mary Zeiss Stange, Raymond Tatalovich,
Timothy D. Terrell, William Van Alstyne, David E. Vandercoy, Eugene Volokh,
Bradley C. S. Watson, Donald Weatherman, John T. Wenders, Thomas G. West,
Samuel C. Wheeler III, James B. Whisker, Keith E. Whittington, Richard G. Wilkins,
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Jean Yarborough, Todd J. Zywicki.
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51. For further detail, see N. Lund, The Ends of SecondAmendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders,, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Politics 157 (1999). text@note51
Donald L. Alexander, Mike Allen, Larry P. Arnn, Kathryn Balmforth, Randy E. Barnett, Herman Belz, Bruce L. Benson, David T. Beito, David J. Bordua, John W. Bowman, David M. Brasington, Kingsley R. Browne, Stanley C. Brubaker, Robert A. Carter, C. David Channell, J. Bradford Churchill, John P. Cochran, Lloyd R. Cohen, James M. Collins, Robert J. Cottrol, Preston K. Covey, Mickey Craig, John W. Danford, Raymond T. Diamond, Jan E. Dizard, Steven Duke, Steven J. Eagle, John C. Eastman, Edward J. Erler, Frank Falero, Morris Fiorina, F. Smith Fussner, Janice J. Gabbert, Todd F. Gaziano, Stephen G. Gilles, Gregory Goering, Fran Haga, J. Daniel Hammond, Francis F. Hawley, David R. Henderson, David M. Henneberry, John Hospers, Ronald A. Howard, Richard Hummel, Lester H. Hunt, Scott C. Idleman, Robert Jacobs, D. Bruce Johnsen, Nicholas Johnson, David L. Kaserman, Don B. Kates, Raymond G. Kessler, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Alan Charles Kors, Michael I. Krauss, David N. Laband, Mark LeBar, Edward F. Leddy, Robert A. Levy, Jody Lipford, Charles H. Logan, Roderick T. Long, Tibor R. Machan, Gregory E. Maggs, Joyce Lee Malcolm, Marie Martin, Ken Masugi, David Mayer, James Ross McCown, Edwin Meese III, J. Mitchell Miller, Gary B. Mills, Carlisle E. Moody, James E. Moore, II, Richard Morgan, John Moser, David B. Mustard, Robert Natelson, Joseph P. Olson, James R. Otteson, Carol K. Oyster, Daniel C. Palm, Jeffrey S. Parker, Mark J. Perry, Ronald J. Pestritto, Michael Pippenger, Daniel D. Polsby, Barry Poulson, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Jeremy Rabkin, Paul A. Rahe, Douglas B. Rasmussen, Gerard Rault, Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Larry E. Ribstein, Charles K. Rowley, Steve Russell, William A. Schroeder, Larry Schweikart, Gerald W. Scully, William F. Shughart II, Robert Barr Smith, Larry D. Soderquist, Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Allan C. Stam, Mary Zeiss Stange, Raymond Tatalovich, Timothy D. Terrell, William Van Alstyne, David E. Vandercoy, Eugene Volokh, Bradley C. S. Watson, Donald Weatherman, John T. Wenders, Thomas G. West, Samuel C. Wheeler III, James B. Whisker, Keith E. Whittington, Richard G. Wilkins, Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Jean Yarborough, Todd J. Zywicki.
[NRA v. Reno (July, 2000)]