The Potowmack Institute
In re Brown, 189 B.R. 653 (Bkrtcy.M.D.La. 1995)
In re Richard Alan BROWN, Debtor.
Bankruptcy No. 94-10670.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Louisiana.
Dec. 15, 1995.
As Amended Jan. 31, 1996.
Samera L. Abide, Chapter 7 Trustee, Baton Rouge, LA.
Randy P. Zinna, Baton Rouge, LA, for debtor.
LOUIS M. PHILLIPS, Bankruptcy Judge.
Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law
A. Applicability of Louisiana Exemption Law.
* * * * * *
His arms and military accoutrements.
La.R.S. 13:3881 (1995).
B. Louisiana Rules of Statutory Construction.
Article 9 of the Louisiana Civil Code instructs the Court as follows:
Art. 9. Clear and unambiguous law
La.Civ.Code art. 9 (1995). (FN8)
Art. 11. Meaning of words
La.Civ.Code art. 11 (1995).
Article 10 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 10. Language susceptible of different meanings
When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.
Article 12 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 12. Ambiguous words
Art. 13. Laws on the same subject matter
C. The Plain Meaning of "Arms and Military Accoutrements."
Black's Law Dictionary 79 (5th ed. 1979).
and ... (1) used as a function word to indicate connection or addition esp. of items within the same class or type; used to join sentence elements of the same grammatical rank or function.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 84 (1983).
A disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things. It is also used to clarify what has already been said, and in such cases, means 'in other words,' 'to-wit,' or 'that is to say.' The word 'or' is to be used as a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things.... In some usages, the word 'or' creates a multiple rather than an alternative obligation; where necessary in interpreting an instrument, 'or' may be construed to mean 'and'.
Black's Law Dictionary 987 (5th ed. 1979).
or ... (1) used as a function word to indicate an alternative (coffee or tea) (sink or swim), the equivalent or substantive character of two words or phrases (lessen or abate) or approximation or uncertainty (five or six days).
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 829 (1983).
So, the term "arms" and the term "military accoutrements" are to be read within the context of their conjunctive joination. Before conjunction, however, what do the respective terms mean? Again, back to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary for a definition of "arms":
Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "arm" as follows:
The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (FN10) defines "arm" as follows:
Finally, Black's Law Dictionary defines "arms" as follows:
Black's Law Dictionary 100 (5th ed. 1979). (FN11)
As noted, the exemption statute refers to "arms" conjointly with "military accoutrements." According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 50 (1983), the term "accoutrements" means (skipping the archaic usage of the word as a verb, meaning "the act of accoutring") "an accessory item of clothing or equipment ... equipment, trappings; specif: a soldier's outfit usu. not including clothes and weapons." According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 13 (1986), the term "accoutrement" means "outfit, furnishings, equipment, trappings, regalia; ... a soldier's outfit (as a rifle belt, pack and other accessories) usually not including clothes and weapons." Further refining the context of "accoutrements" as used within the exemption statute is the modifying adjective "military," which, according to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1753 (1983) means "(a) of or relating to soldiers, arms, or war ... (b) of or relating to armed forces ..." (FN12)
D. Legislative History of La.R.S. 13:3881(A)(4)(c).
E. The Purpose of the Exemption Laws; the Context in Which the Words Occur in the Text of the Statute.
1. The Purpose
2. Context of the Words in the Text
Examination of the context in which the words "arms and military accoutrements" appear as well does not direct the Court to a search for statutory spirit disembodied from the plain meaning of the words. The exemption reference to "arms and military accoutrements" is set apart as a subsection separate from the listing of what might be generally characterized as the "household goods" subpart. (FN16) Analysis of section (4)(a) yields no reference to property used for recreational purposes whatsoever, but is limited to property within the house of a kind necessary for maintaining ongoing home life in clean clothes, with a warm bed, using necessary dishes for food and refrigerators for preserving it. The only references to property which could have recreational use are the family portraits; "musical instruments played or practiced on"; and "all dogs, cats and other household pets" subsections (the "fowl, poultry and one cow" exemption is specifically limited by the requirement that such be kept "for the use of his family," i.e., for eggs, meat and/or milk). (FN17)
F. Interpretation of Statute in Relation to Other Laws Dealing With Same Subject Matter.
1. The United States Constitution
State v. Smith, 11 La.Ann. 633 (1856) (emphasis added).
Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 2, Ch. 13, p. 409 points out 'that king Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom' and traces the subsequent development and use of such forces. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book V. Ch. 1, contains an extended account of the Militia. It is there said: 'Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty.' 'In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier: in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.'
Id., 307 U.S. at 178-182, 59 S.Ct. at 818-820.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Weapons, Section 2b, at 473-474.
2. The Louisiana Militia
1834 Militia Act of March 8, 1834, section 1 (1834).
1904 Militia Act, section 1 (1904).
Like the 1834 Militia Act, the 1904 Act set forth two classes: (1) the active militia, which was comprised of the organized and uniformed military forces of the State (the National Guard of Louisiana); and (2) the reserve militia, which was comprised of all those males liable to service in the militia and the Naval Militia, but who were not serving in the National Guard of Louisiana (section 6).
3. The Louisiana Constitution
Corpus Juris Secundum, Weapons, Section 2b, at 474. (FN23)
Louisiana Constitution, Bill of Rights, art. 3 (1879).
La. Const. art. I, section 11 (1974).
Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.L.Rev. 1, 35-37 (1974).
4. Statutes and Case Law from other Jurisdictions
STATE EXEMPTION STATUTES REGARDING FIREARMS
The above general categories of state exemption statutes strongly indicate that La.R.S. 13:3881(A)(4)(c)'s exemption of "arms and military accoutrements" was meant to exempt a category of arms substantively different from firearms used for personal purposes. Unlike other state exemption statutes which exempt firearms in the context of consumer goods, such as sporting goods, or within a blanket personal property exemption, Louisiana has intentionally chosen to restrict firearm exemptions to those firearms which fall within the limited scope of "arms and military accoutrements."
Clearly, Louisiana could have carved out a separate personal property exemption for firearms, but since the Projet of the Code of Practice of 1825, Louisiana has chosen not to follow states which exempt arms and military accoutrements and separately exempt firearms as personal property, and also has chosen not to follow states which carve out a "personal property" exemption which would allow a debtor to claim firearms because they constitute "personal property." Therefore, it is reasonable for the Court to conclude that La.R.S. 13:3881(A)(4)(c) covers military arms and military accoutrements only, rather than including firearms used for personal purposes.
In this connection, the Court notes that In re Mutchler, 95 B.R. 748 (Bankr.D.Mont.1989), though not of precedential value to this Court, provides an analysis dealing with a state law containing two categories of exemption. Just as importantly, Mutchler, without precisely saying so, supports this Court's initial plain meaning analysis, particularly of the effect of the use of the conjunctive "and" (which, ironically, supports this Court's ultimate conclusion that resort to Mutchler is unnecessary).
In Mutchler, the court held that Chapter 12 farmer/debtors, whose case had been converted to Chapter 7, could not claim guns and rifles as exempt under Mont.Code Ann. section 25-13-613, the governmental function exemption discussed supra in the exemption chart above. The court noted that the purpose of section 25-13-613 was to allow law enforcement personnel, rather than farmers, to exempt from execution all necessary arms and guns required by such persons to keep the peace. The court therefore denied the debtors' claim of exemption under section 25-13-613, because this provision did not allow a farmer an additional exemption for guns or firearms. The court reasoned that through Mont.Code Ann. section 25-13-609(1), Montana already had afforded the debtors a personal property exemption, not to exceed $4,500 in aggregate value. Within this personal property exemption was included the right to exempt, inter alia, "firearms and other sporting goods," to the extent of a value not exceeding $600 in any item. Crucial to the court's holding was that the debtors already had used up their $4,500 personal property exemption with a boat, a boat trailer, a snowmobile, a motorcycle, and other items, and, having used up the personal property exemption, were attempting to fit their firearms within Montana's governmental function exemption because resort to their personal property exemption was no longer available.
As mentioned, the Mutchler case also embraces the same conclusion about the meaning of terms when joined by the word "and." Recall (remember the chart) that the governmental function exemption provision in Montana reads: "all uniforms, and accoutrements required by law to be kept by any person and one gun to be selected by the debtor." The "one gun to be selected by the debtor" clause is seen by the Court as modifying the preceding phrase, or, given the conjunctive "and," to be read within the context of the joined terms. The Mutchler court, therefore, limits the right to exempt "one gun to be selected by the debtor" (which, standing alone, would mean "any one gun ...") by the preceding context created by the "all uniforms and accoutrements required by law ..." phrase, so that the "one gun" must be a gun required to be kept by law, to round out the uniforms and accoutrements, also required by law to be kept.
Boiled to its bones, the Mutchler court was dealing, effectively, with the exact issue before this Court no place to exempt a personal-use gun except within an "arms and military accoutrements"-like statute. Of course, Mutchler had the luxury of an additional (though used- up) exemption provision, against which it could analytically offset the governmental-function exemption language. Though this Court does not share this analytical luxury, given that Louisiana has no additional exemption provision into which firearms could be placed, the analysis is unchanged.
The Court finally notes that in specifically exempting only "arms and military accoutrements," Louisiana has chosen not only to reject enacting a personal property exemption specifically including firearms or which grants a blanket exemption covering all personal property up to an aggregate value, Louisiana also has chosen to reject an in globo "household goods" exemption which, conceivably, could include firearms used for personal purposes. (FN49) A few examples of such statutes are set forth in the following chart.
Though this Court would probably be constrained to find that firearms are not "household goods," (FN57) it need not formally so advise (as there is no such exemption provision in Louisiana law). The aforementioned statutes and cases dealing with a "household goods" exemption are offered merely as the last nail used in the construction of the analytical support for the statutory construction effort upon which the Court embarked.
Suffice it to say that the Louisiana legislature could, at least, have clouded the water regarding whether there was a separate repository for a firearm exemption, through use of a general "household goods" exemption provision. It has not done so.
This Court has utilized its limited linguistic acuity (aided by various dictionaries and grammatical analyses) to determine the plain meaning of "arms and military accoutrements" within La.R.S. 13:3881(A)(4)(c), and has concluded that the only exemption provided is for arms kept for military purposes. (FN58) Resort to the other accepted methods of statutory construction has confirmed, to this Court's satisfaction, the correctness of its plain meaning analysis.
The guns claimed in this case are not exempt because they are not arms kept for military purposes. A separate Order will issue. (FN59)
FN1. The Court is not certain how exemption of firearms for personal use has been treated within this district or elsewhere within Louisiana by Chapter 7 trustees, and points out that in its recollection, this is the first objection to such an exemption claim brought on for hearing before this Court. Though clearly not of earth-tremoring importance, this issue, for all our research can tell us, is faced as one of first impression for a Louisiana court, state or federal.
FN2. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1995).
FN3. Section 522(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title [Title 11], an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this section.... Such property is
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
FN4. See La.R.S. 13:3881(B)(1), which provides:
In cases instituted under the provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code, entitled 'Bankruptcy', there shall be exempt from the property of the estate of an individual debtor only that property and income which is exempt under the laws of the state of Louisiana and under federal laws other than Subsection (d) of Section 522 of said Title 11 of the United States Code.
La.R.S. 13:3881(B)(1) (West Supp.1995).
FN5. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288, 53 S.Ct. 369, 372, 77 L.Ed. 748 (1933).
FN6. La.Civ.Code art. 1 (1995).
FN7. La.Civ.Code art. 2 (1995).
FN8. This version of the Code provision emanates from an earlier and more pointedly colorful directive, found primarily in Article 13 of the Civil Code of 1870: "When a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Also, on the primacy of the "plain meaning rule" within the ambit of federal statutory construction, see generally, U.S. v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345, 1350-51 (1940); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir.1987); Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975). On the plain meaning rule with regard to Bankruptcy Code interpretation, see Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757-60, 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2246-47, 119 L.Ed.2d 519 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 154-60, 112 S.Ct. 527, 529- 33, 116 L.Ed.2d 514 (1991).
FN9. Pioneer Inv. Services v. Brunswick Associates, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1494-95, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).
FN10. This dictionary has print so compact that a magnifying glass is needed to read it. FN11. Black's Law Dictionary defines "bear arms" as follows:
The Second Amendment, U.S. Constitution, provides that the 'right of the people to bear arms, shall not be infringed.' This right has been restricted however by state and federal laws regulating the transportation, sale, use and possession of weapons.
Black's Law Dictionary 140 (5th ed. 1979).
FN12. Though the definition of "accoutrements" points on all fronts to a military context, one supposes that "accoutrements" standing alone could include, for example, a Shriner's tassels, badges, etc.
FN13. As will be shown, numerous states have utilized similar forms of exemption statutes, one must surmise, for the same reasons.
FN14. Actually, Louisiana exemption law may be traced back further than 1825, to French and Spanish law, including, perhaps, the Curia Philipica (1753, 1778), but, given language barriers, the Court has not engaged in this endeavor. The Court, however, has examined the Louisiana Senate Journal, which was available as far back as 1878, and the Louisiana House Journal, which was available as far back as 1881.
FN15. The 1976-1994 revisions of the Louisiana Civil Code did not retain Article 2705 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
The first and second paragraphs of Article 2705 were originally adopted as Article 2675 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, which provided:
The lessor has, for the payment of his rent, and other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on the moveable effects of the lessee, which are found on the property leased.
In the case of predial estates, this right embraces every thing that serves for the labors of the farm, the furniture of the lessee's house, and the fruits produced during the lease of the land; and in the case of houses or other edifices, it includes the furniture of the lessee, and the merchandise contained in the house or apartment, if it be a store or shop.
La.Civ.Code art. 2675 (1825).
The third paragraph of Article 2705 was enacted not as an amendment of Article 2675, but rather as an independent statute, being Act No. 23 of 1852, approved February 11, 1852, and which provided:
That the lessee shall be entitled to retain, out of the property subjected by law to the lessor's privilege, his clothes and linen and those of his wife and family; his bed and those of his wife and family; his arms, military accoutrements, and the tools and instruments necessary for the exercise of the trade or profession by which he gains his living, and that of his family.
Act No. 23 of 1852, at 13 (emphasis added). See Young v. Geter, 185 La. 709, 720, 170 So. 240, 243 (1936).
Article 2675 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 may be traced to Page 322 of the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825; Article 74 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808; and Article 2102 of the Code Napoleon of 1804.
FN16. More on guns as household goods below, though given the Louisiana statute's specific designation of specific (and nonrecreational) categories of household goods within subpart (4)(a), Louisiana has no "household goods" exemption which could cover weapons.
FN17. The "fowl, poultry and one cow" subsection obviously predates cholesterol consciousness.
FN18. See La.Civ.Code art. 13 (1995).
FN19. U.S. Constitution art. 1, section 8.
FN20. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 818, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939).
FN22. Id. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166 (La.1977). With regard to the federal militia, Article I, section 8, clause 15 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, to repel invasions, to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. The States, however, have the responsibility to train the militia. See, generally, Corpus Juris Secundum, Armed Services, section 15, at 556-57.
FN23. See State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94 (1980).
FN24. See State v. Chaisson, 457 So.2d 1257 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1984); State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166 (La.1977); State v. Hamlin, 497 So.2d 1369 (La.1986); State v. Wiggins, 432 So.2d 234 (La.1983).
FN25. Alabama Code section 31-2-78.
FN26. Ala.Code section 6-10-6.
FN27. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. section 33-1125(7).
FN28. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. section 33-1130.
FN29. Conn.Gen.Stat. section 52-352b(I ).
FN30. Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, section 4914.
FN31. Idaho Code section 11-605(1)(a).
FN32. Idaho Code section 11-605(5).
FN33. Indiana Code Ann. section 10-2-6-3.
FN34. Iowa Code Ann. section 627.6(2).
FN35. Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 37-B, section 262.
FN36. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 235, section 34 (Tenth).
FN37. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. section 600.6023(1)(a) (emphasis added).
FN38. Montana Code Ann. section 25-13-609(1)(b) (emphasis added).
FN39. Montana Code Ann. section 25-13-613. See In re Mutchler, 95 B.R. 748 (Bankr.D.Mont.1989).
FN40. Nevada Rev.Stat. section 21-090(1)(I).
FN41. N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. section 511:2(VII).
FN42. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 31, section 1(A)(14).
FN43. Oregon Rev.Stat. section 23.200.
FN44. Tex.Prop.Code section 42.002(a)(7).
FN45. Utah Code Ann. section 39-1-47.
FN46. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 23, section 1529.
FN47. Va.Code section 44-96.
FN48. Wis.Stat.Ann. section 815.18(3)(d).
FN49. In fact, the federal exemption scheme, particularly s 522(d)(3), is an example of a general "household goods" exemption. Section 522(d)(3) provides an exemption of the debtor's interest, not to exceed $400 in value in any particular item or $8,000 in aggregate value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held "primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor."
STATE 'HOUSEHOLD GOODS' EXEMPTION STATUTES
STATE HEADING OF STATUTE PROPERTY EXEMPT
California : 'Election of exemptions if : 'The debtor's interest, not to
: bankruptcy petition is : exceed two hundred dollars
: filed.' : ($200) in value in any
: : particular item, in
: : household furnishings,
: : household goods, wearing
: : apparel, appliances, books,
: : animals, crops, or musical
: : instruments, that are held
: : primarily for the personal,
: : family, or household use of
: : the debtor or a dependent of
: : the debtor.' (FN50)
FN50. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code section 703.140(b)(3).
FN51. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code section 704.020(a)(1). For a case holding that firearms are not "household goods," see In re Eveland, 87 B.R. 117 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1988).
FN52. Colo.Rev.Stat. section 13-54-102(1)(e). See In re Greenlee, 61 B.R. 257 (Bankr.D.Colo.1986) (debtors, who used guns for hunting and who ate the game they killed, but who failed to present evidence that they and their family would be unable to support and feed themselves without hunting, primarily used guns as "recreational items," and thus guns were not exempt as "household goods" under Colorado exemption statute).
FN53. Ga.Code Ann. section 44-13-100(a)(4). For a case holding that firearms do constitute "household goods" and therefore are exempt, see Matter of Raines, 170 B.R. 187 (N.D.Ga.1994).
FN54. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. section 11-504(b)(4). For Maryland cases holding that firearms are not "household goods," see McGreevy v. ITT Financial Services (In re McGreevy), 955 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.1992) (appeal from Maryland federal district court); In re Barnes, 117 B.R. 842 (Bankr.M.D.Md.1990).
FN55. Mo.Ann.Stat. section 513.430(1). For Missouri cases holding that firearms are not "household goods," see In re Oglesby, 98 B.R. 960 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1989); In re Gray, 87 B.R. 591 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988); Oswald v. ITT Financial Services, 85 B.R. 541 (W.D.Mo.1986); and In re Cole, 15 B.R. 322 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1981). For a Missouri case holding that firearms are "household goods," see In re Ray, 83 B.R. 670 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1988).
FN56. S.C.Code Ann. section 15-41-30(3). See In re Stroman, 78 B.R. 785 (Bankr.D.S.C.1987) (debtor's magnum pistol and semiautomatic gun were not "household goods" because such property was not specifically exempted under the South Carolina exemption statute).
FN57. For example, the bankruptcy court in Matter of Raines, 161 B.R. 548 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1993), found that handguns fell within a general household goods exemption, as such were "commonly used to protect the home and its occupants ..." and to "support and facilitate daily household living." Matter of Raines, at 551. The district court opinion at 170 B.R. 187, affirms this fact finding. Notwithstanding this firmly embraced "frontiersy" approach to defense, there is no mention in the opinion of any evidence that the handguns at issue had ever actually been used for defense or that such a means of defense was even necessary; and there certainly is no mention of any evidence which might tend to show that existence of handguns in the home might constitute a constraint against daily "living," by bringing about daily dying or injury, etc.
FN58. Though not considered in this opinion, but worthy of brief mention, is the possibility that firearms might be subject to exemption under Section 13:3881(a)(2) "That property necessary to the exercise of a trade, calling, or profession by which he earns his livelihood, which shall be limited to the following: (a) Tools. (b) Instruments." (Subsections (c) and (d) omitted.) The debtor here is not a policeman and has not suggested a need for this many weapons as necessary for any other trade, calling or profession.
FN59. Because these reasons constitute the now-prevailing law in this district (there is only one judge here), a copy of these reasons is to be sent to all trustees in this district and, as well, the office of the United States Trustee, for the purpose of providing the basis for future case administration, here, consistent with this opinion
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